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In Reimagining Equality: A New Deal for Children of Color, 
Professor Nancy Dowd makes a powerful case for attacking 
inequalities and hierarchies among children at their roots.  She 
reimagines equality against the backdrop of the United States.  As the 
book’s title emphasizes, it is framed within a context of U.S. domestic 
history and culture, U.S. movements for social reform, U.S. political 
structures, and U.S. constitutional doctrine.  This is as it should be, 
because context is essential.  In using the case of black boys in the 
 
* L. Q. C. Professor of Law and director of the Child Rights Project at Emory 
University. She is also David H. Levin Professor of Law Emerita at Levin College of 
Law, University of Florida where she founded the Center on Children and Families.  
Special thanks are due to Jenna Scott, Emory Law School Class of 2020, for her 
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United States as her example, she shows how hierarchies of race, 
gender, and class are established even before birth and how 
entrenched subordination and discrimination operate to block the 
development of black boys, depriving them of a fair start.  She argues 
that these burdens and barriers to maximizing the development of all 
children must be removed if we are to achieve true equality.  
Moreover, she calls for a comprehensive approach of intersecting 
programs to provide the supports that children need to enjoy true 
developmental equality.  In her introduction to this issue of the 
Fordham Urban Law Journal, “Children’s Equality: the Centrality of 
Race, Gender and Class,” Professor Dowd highlights several 
questions that remain to be “explored, discussed and debated” in 
moving forward on the goal of achieving genuine equality among 
children.  In this Essay, I will explore some of these questions in a 
different context, drawing upon a different framework: the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).1 
The CRC is a comprehensive charter of children’s rights.  It is also 
the most rapidly and universally endorsed human rights charter in the 
history of international law.  Opened for signature in 1989, the CRC 
entered into force in 1990 and has been ratified by every nation in the 
world with one glaring exception — the United States.2  The CRC 
begins from the baseline that children are entitled to all of the human 
rights of adult persons as recognized in international law.3  It adds 
additional rights and protections flowing from the unique needs of the 
developing child, defined as any person below age eighteen.4  While it 
is relatively unknown in the United States, the CRC is routinely 
applied by the highest courts in our peer nations.5  Because all of the 
member nations of the European Union are states parties, the CRC is 
foundational to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
 
 1. G.A. Res. 44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989). 
 2. United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV Human Rights: 11. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (updated Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-
11.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/E94S-EJMF]. 
 3. See G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 1, at Preamble. 
 4. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS LAW (Jonathan Todres & 
Shani M. King eds., forthcoming Feb. 2020); G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 1, Art. 1. 
 5. CHILD RIGHTS INT’L NETWORK, REALISING RIGHTS? THE UN CONVENTION 
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD IN COURT 10 (2019), 
https://archive.crin.org/sites/default/files/uncrc_in_court.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C62-
JS4E] (collecting cases involving the CRC from courts around the world between 
2009 and 2017 and noting that courts apply the CRC directly in approximately 25% of 
cases and in 60% use it as an interpretative guide). 
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Rights in Strasbourg, France.6  It has inspired children’s rights 
provisions in numerous modern constitutions, including that of the 
Republic of South Africa.7  The CRC’s approach to rights is markedly 
different from that of the U.S. Constitution, at least as currently 
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Yet it provides a valuable 
comparative perspective on how to move forward on the goal of 
reaching true developmental equality. 
Dowd’s introduction to this special issue, in its final section, points 
out five concerns, each of which I will address and respond to in this 
Essay.8  The first is about the danger of universalizing the model 
rather than concentrating on children of color.  My response will 
explore universality as an opportunity rather than a threat and 
describe the role of the human rights principles of indivisibility and 
interdependence of rights in mitigating the dangers of universalizing.  
The second and third points relate to the dangers of incrementalism 
and the challenge of establishing benchmarks for funding.  I will draw 
upon the CRC to illustrate ways to justify and define appropriate 
levels of funding.  The fourth point asks whether the “intrusive state” 
of contemporary family policy can be transformed into the 
“responsive state” required by her model.  I will illustrate with 
examples from the European experience of how human rights 
principles can promote a responsive model of state engagement.  The 
fifth point is about overcoming the public/private dichotomy that 
distorts current family policies in the United States.  I will use the 
principles of the CRC to challenge the privatization of responsibility 
for children as a violation of children’s human rights.  The CRC 
provides useful insights for avoiding the pitfalls Dowd identifies.  
Most importantly, it provides affirmation on a global scale that a 
developmental approach is essential to the full achievement of 
children’s rights. 
 
 6. EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS & COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN LAW RELATING TO THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
26 (2015) (“The fact that all EU and COE member states are parties to the CRC 
gives the CRC important standing at the European level. It effectively imposes 
common legal obligations on European states with a knock-on effect on the way 
European institutions develop and apply children’s rights.”). For an example of 
application of the CRC by the European Court of Human Rights, see Maslov v. 
Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 1638/03 (2008) (utilizing CRC definition of best interest of 
the child in deportation case). 
 7. Barbara B. Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children’s Rights: 
Incorporating Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1, 37 (1999) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Constitutionalization]. 
 8. Nancy E. Dowd, Children’s Equality: The Centrality of Race, Gender, and 
Class, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 231, 249–51 (2020). 
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I. UNIVERSALITY: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY 
Dowd begins with a warning against universalizing her model: 
“First, it is critical to sustain the focus on racial equality.  This is a 
model built on the problems and issues of children of color, 
specifically Black boys.  They should remain ‘front and center’ and 
not be lost in a ‘universal’ model.”9  I can fully understand this 
concern.  In the United States, our shameful and continuing history of 
racial oppression makes it imperative to keep children of color at the 
forefront.  However, Dowd’s model, although anchored in our history 
of racism, cries out to be universalized to other international and local 
contexts.  Wherever groups of children are marginalized and 
excluded, the lessons of her model apply.  The developmental harms 
and developmental realities are the same.  Discrimination blights the 
lives of Roma children in Europe, Muslim children in China, Catholic 
children in Northern Ireland, Dalit children in India, and Tutsi 
children in Rwanda.10  Differences of gender, religion, ethnicity, and 
physical or mental disability, often perceived rather than real, make 
them “children of a lesser God.”11  In many places, including the 
United States, indigenous and refugee children are targeted for 
exclusion, subordination, and forcible assimilation.12  On a global and 
 
 9. Id. at 248. 
 10. Ed Cairns et al., Psychology’s Contribution to Understanding Conflict in 
Northern Ireland, 1 PEACE & CONFLICT: J. PEACE PSYCHOL. 131, 133 (1995); Dalit 
Children in India — Victims of Caste Discrimination, INT’L DALIT SOLIDARITY 
NETWORK, https://idsn.org/wp-
content/uploads/user_folder/pdf/New_files/India/Dalit_children_in_India_-
_victims_of_caste_discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SQB-Q3YA] (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2019); Roma Children, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/eca/what-we-
do/ending-child-poverty/roma-children [https://perma.cc/Q77L-C6YE] (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2020); Emmanuel Sehene Ruvugiro, Rwanda: The Gruesome Plight of 
Children During the Tutsi Genocide, JUSTICEINFO.NET (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/ictr/34925-online-exhibition-pays-gruesome-
tribute-to-child-suffering-in-rwandan-genocide.html [https://perma.cc/KVQ3-68JG]; 
John Sudworth, China Muslims: Xinjiang Schools Used to Separate Children from 
Families, BBC NEWS (July 4, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
48825090 [https://perma.cc/7BJ5-SARE]. 
 11. “Children of a Lesser God” is an American play by Mark Medoff. The title, 
taken from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s epic poem “Idylls of the King,” refers to children 
who because of accidents of birth are stigmatized as inferior. What Does the Phrase 
Children of a Lesser God Mean?, QUORA, https://www.quora.com/What-does-the-
phrase-children-of-a-lesser-god-mean [https://perma.cc/W3QW-L44H] (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2019). 
 12. UNICEF, OFFICE OF RESEARCH — INNOCENTI, “NO MOTHER WANTS HER 
CHILD TO MIGRATE” 38–55 (2019), https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/Child-
Migration-Horn-of-Africa-part-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XPU-644E] (describing 
discrimination against migrant and refugee children in Europe). 
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even a national level, embracing a “universal model” should 
strengthen rather than dilute the power of the developmental equality 
approach.13 
The universalizing process of human rights law enhances, rather 
than undercuts, the power of the specific.14  The CRC, while it is 
universal in application, addresses the specific needs of different 
groups of children in the specific contexts and environments in which 
they are embedded.15  There is no hierarchy of rights and no right 
trumps another, although different situations may call for balancing 
and harmonization.16 
The CRC’s overarching antidiscrimination provision is stated in 
Article 2: 
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the 
present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without 
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her 
parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national, ethnic, or social origin, property, 
disability, birth or other status. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that 
the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or 
punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, 
or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family 
members.17 
Not only are all forms of discrimination prohibited; the child is also 
protected against discrimination with regard to any of the other rights 
set forth in the CRC.  These rights include: 
 
 13. NANCY E. DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN OF 
COLOR 53–65 (2018). 
 14. Human rights are the ozone layer of the law. BARBARA BENNETT 
WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM 
BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE (2008) [hereinafter, WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN]. The 
making of human rights law involves an interactive and evolutionary process in which 
a consensus forms that certain values are fundamental to human dignity and their 
contours gain specificity through negotiation, ratification and application of universal 
values in different local and global contexts. See The Foundation of International 
Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-
declaration/foundation-international-human-rights-law/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/L3BB-A6K6] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 15. BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, THE ECOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD: HOW OUR 
CHANGING WORLD THREATENS CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 211 (2020) [hereinafter, 
WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY]. 
 16. Id. at 220. 
 17. See G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 1, at Art. 2. 
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 the right to survival and development;18 
 the right to a name and to acquire a nationality and to be cared 
for by one’s parents;19 
 the right to identity and family relations;20 
 the right to family integrity and family reunification;21 
 the rights to a voice in matters affecting the child and to 
participation in judicial or administrative proceedings,22 
 the rights of freedom of religion, conscience, expression and 
association;23 
 the right to protection from maltreatment, neglect, or abuse;24 
 the right to be protected from unlawful invasions of personal and 
family privacy and assaults on honor and reputation;25 
 the rights of refugee children “to receive appropriate protection 
and humanitarian assistance”;26 
 special care and assistance for children with disabilities;27 
 the right to the highest attainable standard of health;28 
 the right to enjoy a standard of living adequate for the child’s 
physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development;29 
 the right to education aimed at equality of opportunity;30 
 the right to practice one’s own culture and religion and to speak 
one’s own language regardless of minority status;31 
 the right to play and leisure;32 
 the right to be protected from economic or sexual exploitation;33 
 
 18. Id. at Art. 6. 
 19. Id. at Art. 7. 
 20. Id. at Art. 8. 
 21. Id. at Arts. 9–10. 
 22. Id. at Art. 12. 
 23. Id. at Arts. 9, 12–15. 
 24. Id. at Arts. 19, 34. 
 25. Id. at Art. 16. 
 26. Id. at Art. 22. 
 27. Id. at Art. 23. 
 28. Id. at Art. 24. 
 29. Id. at Art. 27. 
 30. Id. at Arts. 28–29. 
 31. Id. at Art. 30. 
 32. Id. at Art. 31. 
 33. Id. at Arts. 32. 34. 
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 the right to protection from cruel, degrading or inhumane 
treatment;34 and 
 the right to fair treatment and rehabilitation for children accused 
of crimes.35 
This inventory of the rights protected by the CRC is more than a 
list of disconnected concepts.  The CRC provides a developmentally 
and morally coherent catalog of what all children need in order to 
reach their full potential.  How can there be true equality when a class 
of children is denied the right to an adequate standard of living or an 
education that opens the doors to opportunity?  How can a class of 
children ever achieve true equality if they are deprived of the right to 
a family or the right to health care?  As Dowd’s book so beautifully 
illustrates, violations of children’s rights to equal dignity and 
protection from discrimination implicate every aspect of a developing 
child’s life.36  Systemic inequalities in access to or enjoyment of any of 
the rights listed above reverberate throughout the entire ecology of 
childhood, often condemning children to a lifetime of inequality.37 
II. INDIVISIBILITY AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
As I explain in my book The Ecology of Childhood: How Our 
Changing World Threatens Children’s Rights, a basic principle of 
human rights is that rights are “interdependent and indivisible.”38  
Experts on human rights have written thousands of pages debating 
and discussing the exact meaning and application of this principle.39  
But for our purposes, it is enough to know that this principle is a 
bedrock feature of all human rights charters.  As explained by 
UNICEF: 
Human rights are indivisible. Whether civil, political, economic, 
social or cultural in nature, they are all inherent to the dignity of 
every human person. Consequently, they all have equal status as 
rights. There is no such thing as a ‘small’ right. There is no hierarchy 
of human rights. . . . The realization of one right often depends, 
wholly or in part, upon the realization of others. For instance, the 
 
 34. Id. at Art. 37. 
 35. Id. at Art. 40. 
 36. DOWD, supra note 13, at 79–94. 
 37. WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY, supra note 15, at 220–21. 
 38. James Nickel, Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards a Theory of Supporting 
Relations Between Human Rights, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 984, 985 (2008). 
 39. DANIEL J. WHELAN, INDIVISIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 1 (2010); James 
Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on Its 
Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 281–95 (1993). 
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realization of the right to health may depend on the realization of 
the right to education or of the right to information.40   
Attempts to vindicate one right of the child while ignoring the 
interdependency of rights can lead to tragic unanticipated 
consequences.  In one famous example, a bill introduced by U.S. 
Congressman Tom Harkin to ban importation of goods produced by 
child labor resulted in Bangladesh garment manufacturers laying off 
an estimated 50,000 child laborers.  A study by UNICEF documented 
that many of these children were forced into far more dangerous 
work — including crime and prostitution — in order to survive.41  As 
this example illustrates, the rights to leisure, protection from 
exploitation, and education can have little practical significance to a 
child growing up in a family struggling to put food on the table and a 
roof over their heads.  The reality for such children and their parents 
is stark: in order to survive, every member of the family must work. 
Especially when it comes to children, we cannot treat economic 
and social rights as separate and independent from civil rights.  The 
myths of rugged individualism fall apart when applied to children.  
Babies cannot be expected to “pull themselves up by their 
bootstraps” before they have learned to walk.42  And “it’s hard to 
tighten your belt when you are wearing diapers.”43  The child’s right 
to survival is integrally related to her rights to access food and shelter.  
Her right to healthy development is integrally related to her rights to 
family, play, identity, and protection from abuse.  Children’s rights 
must be regarded as a fabric of interwoven threads that stabilize and 
strengthen the whole. 
 
 40. What Are Human Rights?, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/child-rights-
convention/what-are-human-rights [https://perma.cc/8LQ7-JR55] (last visited Jan. 29, 
2020); WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY, supra note 15, at 220. 
 41. Zehra F. Arat, Analyzing Child Labor as a Human Right: Its Causes, 
Aggravating Policies, and Alternative Proposals, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 177, 179 n.8, 199 
(describing the unintended consequences of the 1993 Child Labor Deterrence Act) 
(Citing to UNICEF, THE STATE OF WORLD’S CHILDREN 1997 24–25 (1997) (regarding 
the developmental impacts of child labor)). 
 42. “‘Pull yourself up by your bootstraps.’ It’s a common phrase in American 
political discourse, particularly present in conservative rhetoric about self-reliance. 
The concept is simple: To pull yourself up by your bootstraps means to succeed or 
elevate yourself without any outside help.” Caroline Bologna, Why the Phrase ‘Pull 
Yourself up by Your Boostraps’ Is Nonsense, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2018), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps-
nonsense_n_5b1ed024e4b0bbb7a0e037d4 [https://perma.cc/6K7M-CR7Q]. 
 43. This slogan comes from a black and white Children’s Defense Fund poster 
circa 1985 depicting a crying baby in diapers that decorated the wall of my first law 
school office; the poster was reduced to tatters as I moved from office to office, but 
the axiom still holds true. 
2020]   REIMAGINING EQUALITY THROUGH THE LENS OF HUMAN RIGHTS361 
This principle of the indivisibility and interdependency of rights 
may seem alien to lawyers trained in U.S. constitutional law.  One of 
the peculiarities of our constitutional jurisprudence is its insistence on 
dividing rights into discrete categories that are then micromanaged 
through the application of distinct and separate tests.  In my classes 
on U.S. constitutional law, I teach my students to be very careful in 
framing a claim.  The Supreme Court has adopted different tests 
based on whether a right is framed as an equality right or a 
fundamental right.  I use an example from the Civil Rights movement 
as Exhibit A for driving home the importance to my students of 
mastering these constitutional tests and understanding their strategic 
limitations.  When advocates for equality challenged racial 
segregation of public swimming pools, the federal courts ruled that 
the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause required that public 
pools be open to all regardless of color.44  Many cities simply closed 
their public pools.45  Equality problem solved: all children, white and 
black, were treated equally badly by being deprived of access to 
public swimming pools.  Of course, we all know (as did the jurists who 
drew these lines) that affluent white children had many other 
options.46  When pools and schools were closed, private swim clubs, 
country clubs, and the notorious “segregation academies” quickly 
took their place.  These alternatives were open to the affluent, for a 
price, and sufficiently “private” to continue discriminating against 
children of color.47 
As this example illustrates, advocates for children’s rights in the 
U.S. are forced to maneuver within some very strange and arbitrary 
boundaries.  But in seeking to reform our constitutional doctrines, we 
can and should borrow insights from modern constitutions of other 
countries and from human rights charters that treat rights more 
holistically. 
 
 44. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 45. John A. Kirk, Going Off the Deep End: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Desegregation of Little Rock’s Public Swimming Pools, 73 ARK. HIST. Q. 138, 149–50 
(2014) (discussing the closing of public pools by officials in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
following attempts by civil rights leaders to integrate the facilities in advance of 
expected passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 46. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 223–25. 
 47. Marilyn Grady & Sharon C. Hoffman, Segregation Academies Then and 
School Choice Configurations Today in Deep South States, 2 CONTEMP. ISSUES 
EDUC. LEADERSHIP 1, 5–6 (2018). 
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III. INCREMENTALISM VERSUS MAXIMIZATION 
Professor Dowd’s second and third points concern the tensions 
between maximization and incrementalism.  In her second point she 
asks: “[I]n addition to preventing the erasure of race, how can radical 
change be sustained,” and “domestication” avoided, “meaning a less 
comprehensive or watered down version of the New Deal.”48  She 
cites the current enthusiasm for early childhood policies among 
presidential candidates as an example of the danger of sacrificing the 
big picture in order to achieve incremental change in one area. 
Her third point is closely related: “[A]s a theoretical, constitutional 
argument, or policy argument, it is important to solidify justifying 
maximum support (development to every child’s capacity) versus a 
minimum or adequate level.  This is a domestication danger tied to 
arguments over resources that lead to sustaining hierarchy.”49  This 
question poses matters of strategy as well as matters of theory and is 
closely related to the question, discussed below, of “How much is 
enough?” 
In these two points, Dowd raises important questions that are 
fundamental to any movement for social change.  Strategies of 
incrementalism can result in damaging capitulation, and strategies of 
maximization can result in damaging backlash and failure.50  Dowd’s 
concern about the domestication danger of incremental change and 
her use of the phrase “minimum or adequate”51 calls to mind the 
continuing struggle to define and implement equality rights for 
children with disabilities.52  The movement was still celebrating a 
major victory in Congress when it suffered a major defeat at the 
Supreme Court, in the landmark 1982 Supreme Court case of Board 
of Education v. Rowley.53  The Rowley case was the first from the 
 
 48. Dowd, supra note 8, at 249. 
 49. Id. at 249–50. 
 50. The history of social justice movements for racial equality and their defeats in 
legislatures and the courts is one example of this danger. Cases like Dred Scott, 60 
U.S. 393 (1857), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), marked dramatic 
setbacks for the abolition and desegregation movements. Cases like Bradwell v. 
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872), and Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), denying 
women the right to practice law and vote, delayed the progress of women’s rights for 
decades. As a law clerk in the mid 1980s, I recall how the Court’s ruling in Bowers v. 
Hardwicke, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), became a roadblock that took almost 20 years to 
dismantle. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 
393 (1857).  
 51. Dowd, supra note 8, at 249–50. 
 52. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192–94 (1982). 
 53. 458 U.S. 176. 
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Supreme Court to interpret the newly enacted Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act.54  Ten-year-old Amy Rowley was born 
with a severe hearing impairment, and her parents were also hearing 
impaired.  Cliff and Nancy Rowley had been educated at Gallaudet 
and were fluent in American Sign Language (ASL).  Knowing how 
important sign language had been to their own intellectual 
development, Amy’s parents fought hard to ensure her not just the 
free public education to which she was entitled under the new law but 
one that would equip her to achieve her full potential.55 Initially, a 
sign language interpreter had been part of her IEP (Individualized 
Education Program).56  However, the Hendrik Hudson School 
District discontinued her classroom sign language interpreter, and 
substituted in her place a very loud hearing aid.  The school board 
argued that the expense of a sign language interpreter was excessive 
since Amy was learning enough to pass from one grade to the next.57  
Although Amy missed most of what was taking place in the 
classroom, the school board fought Amy’s case all the way to the 
Supreme Court.  The school lost in the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York and again in the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit because it was clear from the evidence that Amy 
was performing far below her natural potential in merely passing 
from grade to grade.58  The Supreme Court, in a five to three 
decision, reversed the lower courts and held that Amy was “receiving 
an ‘adequate’ education, since she performs better than the average 
child in her class and is advancing easily from grade to grade” while 
also receiving “personalized instruction and related services 
calculated by . . . school administrators to meet her educational 
needs.59  In other words, as long as Amy was receiving “some 
benefit,” she was not being denied her statutory right to a free 
 
 54. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (1975). 
 55. Amy’s case drew massive media coverage, not only because it involved an 
appealing story about a spunky child but also because it was the first oral argument in 
the history of the Supreme Court by a hearing-impaired lawyer relying on computer 
technology to translate the spoken word into writing. 
 56. “The term ‘individualized education program’ or ‘IEP’ means a written 
statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in 
accordance with section 1414(d) of this title.” Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(14). 
 57. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185. 
 58. Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist., 632 F.2d 945, 
953 (2d Cir. 1980); Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist., 
483 F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 59. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209–10 (quoting Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534). 
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appropriate public education.60  Justice White, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, lodged an acerbic dissent: 
It would apparently satisfy the Court’s standard of “access to 
specialized instruction and related services which are individually 
designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child,” 
for a deaf child such as Amy to be given a teacher with a loud voice, 
for she would benefit from that service.  The Act requires more.  It 
defines “special education” to mean “specifically designed 
instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique 
needs of a handicapped child.”61 
The Rowley case exemplifies what can happen when a 
revolutionary statute designed to maximize every child’s capacity gets 
into the hands of skeptics with resource concerns.  We can draft 
legislative proposals but what happens next depends on federal and 
state legislatures, governors and presidents, state and federal 
agencies, the judiciary, and countless other players. 
IV. HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? 
There is a lot of space between “minimum or adequate” and 
“excessive.”  “How much is enough” when it comes to resource 
allocation appears in many guises.  There is no way to escape this 
question; “maximization” is a strategy, not a metric.  When the 
question is “how much can we afford to spend on children?,” the 
CRC provides an answer that depends on who is asking the question.  
This answer makes a lot of sense and should prevail in disputes about 
the allocation of resources in any nation, especially one as rich as the 
United States. 
CRC Article 4 provides: 
States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, 
administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the 
rights recognized in the present Convention.  With regard to 
economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake 
such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources 
and, where needed, within the framework of international co-
operation.62 
The basis in law and tradition of this standard is obvious.  When 
determining what level of parental support is appropriate for 
 
 60. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 211 (White, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25) (1975)). 
 
 62. See G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 1, at Art. 4 (emphasis added). 
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children, family courts look at the resources of the parent.63  Dowd’s 
New Deal is premised on the belief that all children are “our own” 
and that “we the people” through our government have a moral 
obligation to all of our nation’s children.64 
Constitutional scholars would reply that, in contrast to the CRC 
and other human rights documents, the U.S. Constitution has been 
interpreted as a charter of “negative rights” — rights to be free from 
government interference.65  They would argue that it does not protect 
“positive” or “economic, social and cultural rights.”66  This Essay 
argues that we must push back against this narrow interpretation of 
the rights protected by our Constitution.  As Dowd’s book makes 
clear, the boundary between positive and negative rights is difficult to 
defend analytically, since a failure on the part of the state to take 
positive action to correct abuses and address inequalities is 
tantamount to action.  To the extent the state has responsibility for 
children’s welfare, state inaction must be recognized as a form of 
neglect.  In cases like Deshaney v. Winnebago County, the Court has 
limited the state’s responsibility for children to situations in which the 
child is actually in state custody.67  Even accepting the validity of the 
divide between public and private responsibility (which I will 
challenge in my subsequent remarks in Part VII), the question of 
“how much is enough” cannot be sidestepped.  It is inherent to 
interpretation of congressional intent in statutory programs like the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act at issue in Rowley.  The 
question there was how to interpret the statutory mandate to provide 
“specialized instruction and related services which are individually 
designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.”68  
The Court rejected the more individualized, maximizing approach 
that had been endorsed by the district and appellate courts and held 
 
 63. The various models for computing child support all start with examination of 
the parent or parents’ financial resources. Child Support Guideline Models by State, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 20, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-
services/guideline-models-by-state.aspx [https://perma.cc/A8P5-WEAK]. 
 64. Dowd, supra note 8, at 241–42. 
 65. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.). 
 66. See WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY, supra note 15, at 220–22; see also Cecile Fabre, 
Constitutionalizing Social Rights, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 219, 263 (1998). 
 67. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989) 
(“[A] State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not 
constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”). The DeShaney Court recognized 
that the state may have a constitutional duty to protect a child from harm “when the 
State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it 
renders him unable to care for himself.” Id. at 199–200. 
 68. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982). 
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instead that merely passing from grade to grade was an adequate 
measure of “educational benefit.”69 
But Amy’s story did not end with this defeat.  When I clerked at 
the Supreme Court in the 1984 Term, I had the honor of taking Amy, 
by then in middle school, on a grand tour of the Court — an imposing 
marble palace she had never entered but whose geography she knew 
by heart.  I had gotten to know Amy and her family when my son and 
Amy were in the same nursery school.  Amy’s parents had not 
brought ten-year-old Amy to the Court for the oral argument in 1982 
because of the media circus.  By the time Amy visited me at the 
Court, her family had moved to a school district that agreed she 
needed access to a sign language interpreter.  Amy already knew 
every detail of the courtroom — she pointed out the lectern where 
her lawyer stood and she ran behind bench, calling out the names of 
each justice as she passed his or her chair.  She was surprised to find 
that the floor of the “highest court in the land” (as the clerks 
nicknamed the basketball court tucked under the roof of the building) 
was made of wood.  She had thought it too would be made of marble.  
Amy went on to earn her doctorate at the University of Wisconsin, 
and she is currently an Associate Professor and Coordinator of the 
American Sign Language Program in Modern Languages and 
Literatures at California State University, East Bay.70 
This is a story about a deaf girl, not about the black boys that 
Professor Dowd chooses as her protagonists.71  But Amy’s story is still 
relevant to a book about developmental equality.  It provides an 
example of how the answer to “how much is enough?” can change as 
societies evolve and as formerly excluded children write their own 
stories.  Amy and her peers — the first generation of children to 
benefit from a right to education — have changed the debate.  Thanks 
to their stories, the children we once referred to as disabled are 
increasingly seen as differently abled.  Their story is part of a broader 
social movement for children’s liberty and equality that is integrally 
related to the advancement of children’s rights as human rights.  Dr. 
 
 69. Id. at 202–03. 
 70. Faculty Profile for Amy June Rowley, CAL. ST. UNIV., E. BAY, 
https://www.csueastbay.edu/directory/profiles/mll/rowleyamy-june.html 
[https://perma.cc/CRL4-3J9R] (last visited September 4, 2019). 
 71. Disability is a form of diversity, but it is not the same as race, gender, and 
other socially constructed differences. “The complex, variable, and contingent nature 
of disability demands different approaches and different remedies than those apt for 
other identity markers.” Margaret Winzer & Kas Mazurek, Diversity, Difference, and 
Disability: Conceptual Contradictions and Present Practice in Inclusive Schooling for 
Students with Disabilities, 4 INT’L DIALOGUES EDUC. 225, 225 (2017). 
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Margaret A. Winzer, in her history of special education, traces the 
origins of the modern special education movement to the period of 
the French enlightenment.72  “The phenomenal growth of special 
education in the latter half of the eighteenth century was part of a 
wider movement that involved the abolition of social classes, the 
establishment of a just society, and the accession to full human rights 
of all members of that society.”73  Despite setbacks like Amy’s early 
Supreme Court defeat, Amy and her peers have been freed to 
demonstrate their own amazing capacities when liberated from 
discrimination and its developmental effects.  They are following in 
the footsteps of children like Fredrick Douglass, Helen Keller, and 
Willa Cather whose stories about liberty and equality I told in Hidden 
in Plain Sight: The Tragedy of Children’s Rights from Ben Franklin to 
Lionel Tate.74 
Recently, the Supreme Court decided another Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) case turning on the definition of a 
free appropriate public education.75  In Endrew F., a case involving an 
autistic child, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had applied a de 
minimis standard, based on the “some benefit” language of Rowley.76  
Advocates feared that the current, far more conservative, Supreme 
Court might decide a split among the circuits by endorsing the Tenth 
Circuit’s narrow standard.77  In a unanimous decision written by Chief 
Justice Roberts, the Court found that “de minimis progress” was too 
low a bar.78  Instead, in order “[t]o meet its substantive obligation 
under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to 
enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
 
 72. MARGARET A. WINZER, THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION: FROM 
ISOLATION TO INTEGRATION 5 (1993). 
 73. Id. As Professor Dorothy Roberts points out, the Enlightenment notoriously 
excluded enslaved people of color from its social justice movement. DOROTHY 
ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-
CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 28–32 (2011). 
 74. WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN, supra note 14, at 51, 159, 180. 
 75. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. School Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 
991 (2017) (defining “free appropriate public education”). 
 76. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 
1340 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017), remanded to and vacated sub 
nom Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 694 F. App’x 654 
(10th Cir. 2017). 
 77. See, e.g., Brief for Children’s Law Center et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 
(2017) (No. 15-827). 
 78. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001. 
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circumstances.”79  It further clarified that a child’s “educational 
program must be appropriately ambitious in light of his 
circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is 
appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom.  
The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet 
challenging objectives.”80  This was not a complete victory for 
developmental equality.  The Court avoided explicitly overruling 
Rowley, and it rejected the argument that an IEP must “provide a 
child with a disability opportunities to achieve academic success, 
attain self-sufficiency, and contribute to society that are substantially 
equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities.”81  
But its endorsement of ambitious individualized educational plans 
with challenging objectives appropriate to the specific child’s 
circumstances was a far cry from Rowley’s anemic “some benefit.”82 
V. TRANSFORMING THE INTRUSIVE STATE INTO THE RESPONSIVE 
STATE 
Dowd’s fourth point begins with the question: “[C]an the intrusive 
state become a responsive state?”83  This point is well taken, and my 
answer to the question is “Yes, it can!” 
The term “intrusive state” represents an accurate picture of 
contemporary U.S. relationships between the state and many families, 
especially those families in greatest need of support.  Despite the 
explicit goals of protecting children, our child protection systems are 
highly punitive.84  In representing poor parents and children, an 
attorney’s primary goal is often simply to get the state out of their 
client’s life.85  In cases of abuse and neglect, jurisdiction over the 
family is established through a finding of “dependency,” which can 
 
 79. Id. at 1002. 
 80. Id. at 1000. 
 81. Id. at 1001. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Dowd, supra note 8, at 250. 
 84. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD 
WELFARE (2002); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Making Poor Mothers Fungible: The 
Privatization of Foster Care, in CHILD CARE AND INEQUALITY: RE-THINKING 
CAREWORK FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH (Francesca M. Cancian et al. eds., 2002), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=305882 [https://perma.cc/3RM2-BFV5]. 
 85. See generally Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child 
Protective Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of Lawyers Who Help 
Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (1998). 
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trigger a cascade of negative consequences.86  “The role of the 
parent’s attorney during the jurisdiction trial resembles that of the 
defense attorney in a criminal case.”87  They prioritize defeating the 
state’s attempts to “help” because state intervention so often results 
in tearing families apart rather than building them up.88 Americans 
have been so thoroughly indoctrinated in the belief that relationships 
between government and the “private” family are inherently 
antagonistic, that it has become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  In a major 
Catch-22, “coercive” intervention is often a prerequisite to accessing 
services, because only when the state can justify piercing the shell of 
family privacy does its intervention trigger eligibility.  Under typical 
child protection statutes, in order for a court to mandate that the state 
provide support services to a family, it must first find that the child is 
“dependent,” meaning lacking proper parental care and supervision.89  
In addition, when a child is declared “dependent,” a statutory clock 
starts ticking requiring the state to initiate a termination of parental 
rights unless the parent has succeeded in correcting the problem that 
brought the state into the family’s private space.90  Often these 
problems are beyond the parent’s control, such as lack of housing, or 
are impossible to accomplish within the statutory time frame, such as 
recovery from addiction.  Not surprisingly, the result of these punitive 
interventions is deep distrust of government.  This distrust is the by-
product of government’s repeated failure to treat families with dignity 
and respect.  And that failure of respect is based on the presumption 
 
 86. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., THE JUVENILE DEPENDENCY COURT 
AND YOU: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS 9 (2014), 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/juvenile-dependency-court-and-you.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FP9B-KGNJ]. 
 87. Vivek Sankaran, Representing Parents in Child Welfare Cases, in CHILD 
WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE 
AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES 579–615 (D. Duquette & 
A. Haralambie eds., 2010). 
 88. See Bailie, supra note 85, at 2286. 
 89. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (1986). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT (2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UYE7-6CK8]. This language is typical of the phrases used in child 
welfare statutes to define a child who is “dependent” and therefore within the 
jurisdiction of the state or local child welfare agency. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-
11-311 (2014). 
 90. See generally David Herring, The Adoption and Safe Families Act — Hope 
and Its Subversion, 34 FAM. L. Q. 329 (2000); Adrienne Whitt-Woosley & Ginny 
Sprang, When Rights Collide: A Critique of the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
from a Justice Perspective, 93 CHILD WELFARE 111 (2014). 
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that, in order to qualify for government services, the family must 
already have failed.91 
On the other hand, my research in Italy over the past decade 
suggests the possibility of a very different relationship between the 
state and the family.92  In every village, town or city I visited, small 
automobiles labeled “Servizi Sociali” (social services) were a common 
sight.  These cars are used by government health care and social 
service workers.  Their job is to make the rounds of their community, 
delivering oxygen tanks to the elderly, physical therapy and education 
services to ill children and disabled or convalescent adults, and a wide 
range of voluntary in-home medical and social supports that are free 
of charge and free of stigma.  Italy’s national health care system 
works relatively seamlessly in partnership with social services, 
generally without resort to coercive tactics.  The same is true for 
situations involving delinquent children.  Under Italy’s juvenile justice 
system, when a child under age 14 gets into trouble it is treated as a 
public health problem calling for provision of mental health and 
support services to the child and family.  Criminal acts by youths aged 
14 to 18 also trigger appointment of a team to identify appropriate 
family and community services, education, and rehabilitation.  
Detention of minors in locked facilities is a last resort, only 
considered appropriate when all other avenues have been tried and 
have failed.93  Termination of parental rights in cases of abuse or 
neglect has also been a last resort.  There have been cases involving 
unnecessary removals, but they tend to trigger fierce public outcry.94  
 
 91. DANIEL L. HATCHER, THE POVERTY INDUSTRY, THE EXPLOITATION OF 
AMERICA’S MOST VULNERABLE CITIZENS (2016); ROBERTS, supra note 84. 
 92. From 2007 to 2019, I conducted a longitudinal, comparative study of systems 
of child protection, health care, juvenile justice, and family and child supports in Italy 
and the United States I describe and compare the two systems in my book The 
Ecology of Childhood, supra note 15. 
 93. Sayali Himanshu Bapat & Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Is There Justice for 
Juveniles in the United States, India, and Italy?: Towards a Framework for 
Transnational Comparisons, in THE FUTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: PROCEDURE AND 
PRACTICE FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 37 (Tamar R. Birckhead & Solange 
Mouthann eds., 2016). 
 94. One such case, described in The Ecology of Childhood, involved a toddler 
whose mother had been deemed to have constructively abandoned him during a 
period when she was heavily involved with drugs. As a response to public outcry, he 
was allowed to remain with his mother in a therapeutic community that accepted 
family units. Another example of public outrage is the national scandal that erupted 
in July 2019 over allegations of inappropriate removals of children in Reggio Emilia. 
Alessandro Fulloni, Bibbiano, Quattro Bambini Tornano Dai Genitori Naturali, 
CORRIERE DELLA SERA (July 24, 2019), 
https://www.corriere.it/cronache/19_luglio_23/bibbiano-quattro-bambini-tornano-
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In the case of Italy and under the CRC framework, the state is viewed 
as a partner in meeting children’s needs rather than as an adversary.  
This is in stark contrast to the child welfare system currently in place 
in the United States.  But Italy and other countries that have 
embraced children’s rights as human rights can give us hope that 
change at the national level is possible. 
VI. THE ROLE OF GRASSROOTS CHANGE 
Dowd’s fourth comment continues: 
If the broad legislative solutions at the federal [level] such as I have 
sketched here are not possible because the idea of the responsive 
state is [not] embraced, or is deeply problematic, then other ways to 
accomplish this have to be devised.  This suggests solutions geared 
toward facilitating grassroots, nongovernmental change rather than 
centralized federal programs.95 
I agree with Dowd that there are many other ways to effect change 
than in Washington, D.C.  However, drawing upon lessons learned 
during the process of implementation of the CRC, I would argue that 
advocacy at the regional and grassroots level should not be viewed as 
a fallback position but as integrally related to the success of Dowd’s 
New Deal. 
Dowd’s ambitious project calls for action at every level, not only at 
the federal level.  This strategy has been essential to the spread of 
children’s rights in nations around the globe.  In the 30 years since the 
CRC’s entry into force in 1990, many scholars, governments, and 
NGOs have documented best practices for winning support for the 
CRC’s innovative principles.  These practices have been applied in a 
wide variety of local contexts, in the European Union, Africa, Asia, 
the Americas, and Australia and New Zealand.96  In my book The 
Ecology of Childhood, I explore how the new and potentially 
controversial principles of the CRC were “domesticated” in the best 
 
genitori-naturali-ecbb0f06-ad31-11e9-aafc-ff288f0f153c.shtml?refresh_ce-cp 
[https://perma.cc/Y7ZG-ZF5J] (children’s court returns four children to their homes 
after police investigation finds irregularities in documents submitted by psychologist 
and foster care agency). 
 95. Dowd, supra note 8, at 250–51. 
 96. See generally UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, NEW ZEALAND 
CHILDREN’S COMMISSIONER, https://www.occ.org.nz/childrens-rights-and-
advice/uncroc/ [https://perma.cc/38VW-GPLQ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) (discussing 
how New Zealand and Australia have incorporated the CRC); About Children’s 
Rights, AUSTRALIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-
work/childrens-rights/about-childrens-rights [https://perma.cc/86SY-5LJQ] (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2020) (same). 
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sense of the word in the laws of Italy and Wales, and in many other 
nations of the European Union.97  Success depended on a broad-
based public education effort — which is an integral part of the CRC 
scheme since the CRC has many articles requiring education of 
children and the public concerning the rights of the child — and 
mobilization of support from NGOs, opinion makers, industry, 
nonprofits, and community-based organizations.98 
In addition, much can be learned by exploring American history 
regarding the process of entrenchment of rights in political culture 
and popular imagination.  How did Roosevelt’s New Deal generate 
regional and local support?  Through what process did Medicare and 
Social Security become so deeply ingrained in the American 
experience that they are now referred to as the “third rail” of politics 
— meaning that if an unwary politician dares to touch them she can 
expect to die a swift and painful death?  More recently, how did 
LGBTQ families go from being ostracized, closeted, and criminalized 
to achieving widespread visibility and support?  It would not have 
happened without changes at the grassroots, nongovernmental level.  
Here is a story that powerfully illustrates the role of personal 
experience in promoting appreciation of rights.  Thirty years ago, 
Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell cast the deciding vote upholding 
criminal penalties for consensual sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick.99  
At the time, he remarked to his fellow justices that he bore no animus 
towards “homosexuals” and did not think he had ever met one.100  In 
fact, many of his law clerks over the years had been LGBTQ, 
including during the year when Bowers was decided.  He was a kind 
and caring individual who loved his law clerks as if they were his 
children.  As news of his comment spread around the Court, his gay 
clerks decided to come out to him.  He later stated that he regretted 
his vote and would have voted differently.  Hearts as well as minds 
are opened when we can see other people’s children as our own.101 
 
 97. WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY, supra note 15, at 225–59, 290–93. 
 98. Id. at 289–96; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 99. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197–98 (1986). 
 100. Linda Greenhouse, Black Robes Don’t Make the Justice, But the Rest of the 
Closet Just Might, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/04/us/black-robes-don-t-make-the-justice-but-the-
rest-of-the-closet-just-might.html [https://perma.cc/VZ7F-8V5M]. 
 101. My own personal experience with Justice Powell confirms this story. In the 
1984 term, two years before Bowers, I clerked for Justice O’Connor. That year, two 
of Powell’s four law clerks were gay. Justice Powell was clearly oblivious. I will never 
forget him introducing me to the partner of a female clerk during a reception in the 
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VII. MOVING BEYOND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY 
Professor Dowd’s fifth and final concern is presented as “a 
corollary” to her question about the intrusive/responsive state.  She 
asks, “can we imagine supporting families and parents instead of 
privatizing responsibility, or explaining or blaming families for 
structural inequalities?”102  Dowd continues, “[u]nder the guise of 
respecting families we have made privacy the support for inequality.  
Is our commitment to equality strong enough to support all families 
because they are essential to children?”103 
Dowd’s comments about the pernicious effects of the public-
private dichotomy ring true, as do her concerns about the possibility 
of transformation.  She is pointing out the pitfalls and shoals that lie 
ahead.  In the following Section, I will address her underlying 
question: How do we transform a culture from one that idolizes 
autonomy and condemns vulnerability to one that honors 
vulnerability and prizes solidarity? 
First, as Dowd agrees, we must stop demonizing vulnerability and 
start accepting it as the most fundamental and inevitable aspect of the 
human experience.  The work of our Emory colleague Martha 
Albertson Fineman and her Vulnerability and the Human Condition 
Initiative is leading the way in accomplishing that transformation.104  
Fineman urges that, far from marginalizing vulnerability as a form of 
individual failure, we should accept it as a sign of our common 
humanity and intrinsic value.105  She calls for a responsive state that is 
committed to mitigating vulnerability and building resiliency for all its 
members including children.106  Fineman’s initiative has grown, 
 
justices’ dining room: “Barbara, have you met Mary’s friend Jane?” (I am using 
pseudonyms). I replied that I had. We law clerks all knew that Jane and Mary had 
long been a committed couple. He went on, “Did you know that Jane took a leave of 
absence from her teaching position and moved all the way to Washington, D.C. to 
help Mary during her clerkship? Now isn’t that a true friend!” Should I have 
corrected Justice Powell’s misimpression instead of smiling at his naiveté? I often 
wonder if it would have made a difference. 
 102. Dowd, supra note 8, at 251. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable in Law 
and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR 
LAW AND POLITICS (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013) 
(Fineman’s initiative has grown during the decade since its inception into a 
movement with global impact); see also DOWD, supra note 13, at 84–85; 
WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY, supra note 15, at 28, 285. 
 105. Fineman, supra note 104, at 16. 
 106. Id. at 24–27. 
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during the decade since its inception, into an international movement 
with global impact.107 
Second, reimagining equality for children calls for the ecological 
approach to understanding child development.108  This is an essential 
tool in breaking down the artificial divide between public and private 
spheres.  Pioneered by social scientist Urie Bronfenbrenner, the 
ecological model, which Dowd extolls and applies in her work, allows 
us to see children’s development in social context.109  Instead of 
imagining the child and her family in isolation from the rest of society, 
we see family and child as embedded in a matrix of intersecting 
microsystems (for example, family, neighborhood, school, faith 
community, peer group) that constitute the intimate (not private) 
spaces in which they live their lives.110  In the ecological model, these 
core spaces are encircled by rings of ecosystems.111  These are places 
where the child may rarely go but which powerfully affect her well-
being (such as the parent’s workplace, the labor and economic 
markets, the healthcare system, the justice system, and the housing 
markets).112  Surrounding and permeating the child’s world is the 
macrosystem, that climate of ideas, values, prejudices and powers that 
reaches every level of the society.113  Just as water permeates the 
natural environment, so the macrosystem nourishes or poisons the 
child’s environment.  As this model reveals, the biggest challenge to 
children’s developmental equality is reforming the American 
macrosystem.  This is no easy task.  Our macrosystem has long been 
dominated by unrestrained capitalism, individualism, and 
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materialism, and it continues to be poisoned by racism, sexism, 
violence and entrenched hierarchy. 
But the tradition of transformation is also entrenched in our social 
and constitutional history.  Many hierarchies formerly viewed as 
normal and natural have crumbled in the face of constitutional 
challenges.  The constitution itself, despite what some might argue, is 
not immune to change.  To quote the Notorious RBG, writing in 
United States v. Virginia in 1996, “A prime part of the history of our 
Constitution is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and 
protections to people once ignored or excluded.”114  As Ginsburg 
explains, the American story of change has “continued as our 
comprehension of ‘We the People’ expanded.”115  At the time of the 
VMI decision, the story of childrens’ emerging rights was already 
reflected in precedents rejecting discrimination against children of 
minority races116 and children born to unmarried parents.117  In the 
two decades since the VMI decision, this process of change has 
continued.  We have acknowledged that application of the death 
penalty or life in prison without possibility of parole infringes on the 
rights of children to be protected from cruel and unusual 
punishments.118  And we have recognized that discrimination against 
same sex marriage unjustly punishes children growing up in gay and 
lesbian families.119  In each of these cases, emerging human rights 
have been cited by the Court and in amicus briefs, not as binding 
authority but as evidence of global transformations. 
In The Constitutionalization of Children’s Rights: Incorporating 
Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, published 
shortly after Justice Ginsburg’s VMI opinion, I trace the path by 
which human rights, even in the absence of ratification of a specific 
treaty, can become incorporated into our domestic system of 
constitutional law.120  I compare the provisions of the newly minted 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa recognizing children’s 
rights (provisions that mirror the CRC, which South Africa had 
formally ratified) with the more gradual story of children’s emerging 
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rights as reflected in the process of constitutional interpretation that 
Ginsburg highlights in VMI. 
I used the case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County as my example 
of a disconnect between children’s U.S. constitutional rights and 
children’s human rights.121  That case involved some of the most 
problematic principles of U.S. constitutional law — the dichotomies 
between public and private and between state action and inaction.122  
The question was whether the state child protection agency could be 
held liable for its failure to protect a child named Joshua.123  Despite 
evidence of abuse, the state had released the child to the custody of 
his father, but under supervision by county protective services.124  
Ignoring cogent evidence of risk to the child, the agency failed to act 
to protect him.125  Writing for a majority of six, Justice Rehnquist 
concluded that a state has no affirmative duty under the Due Process 
Clause to protect a child, even one under its supervision, against 
“private” violence.126 
As Justice Blackmun famously lamented: 
Poor Joshua!  Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, 
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by 
respondents, who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who 
knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing 
except, as the Court revealingly observes . . . “dutifully recorded 
these incidents in [their] files.”  It is a sad commentary upon 
American life, and constitutional principles — so full of late of 
patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about “liberty and justice 
for all,” that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out 
the remainder of his life profoundly retarded.127 
Many years ago, one of my constitutional law students surprised 
me by challenging my statement that children are nowhere mentioned 
in the U.S. Constitution.  Pointing to the Preamble, he argued, 
“Doesn’t it say right here in black and white that its purpose is ‘to 
Secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity?’”  I 
would argue that my student got it right.  The framers chose those 
words to instruct us in our duty to use the document they created for 
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posterity as well as for the specific ends they had in their limited field 
of view.  They believed in liberty as a value in search of perfection, 
not as a static definition of existing rights.  Professor Dowd has shown 
us the way as we continue to explore the open textured concepts of 
liberty, equality, and dignity as applied to persons of all ages and 
capacities.  As I wrote 20 years ago: 
[R]ecognition of emerging rights depends on a robust belief among 
judges and the people in the legitimacy of judicial interpretation.  
Judges must approach the written document as a “living” thing, not 
only open to interpretation, but positively designed to grow through 
judicial interpretation.  Neither the amendment process nor the 
democratic process alone can provide meaningful avenues for 
growth and renewal when the emerging claims are those of isolated 
minorities or even of numerical majorities who have been 
systematically excluded from power.128 
My faith in the Supreme Court as an engine of progress in human 
rights has frayed since I wrote those words.  Its stature as an 
independent coequal branch has been undermined by partisan efforts 
by the Republican-controlled Senate and Executive Branch to block 
the Court’s normal process of renewal and to pack both the Supreme 
Court and the federal judiciary with “originalists” committed to 
rolling back constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
As I write, the Trump administration is also mounting a new attack 
on the very concept of evolving human rights.  On July 8, 2019, the 
State Department announced the creation of a “human rights 
advisory panel” to examine the role of human rights in American 
foreign policy.129  According to the top Democrat on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, the argument for a human rights panel 
is absurd, especially in light of the fact that the Trump administration 
“has taken a wrecking ball to America’s global leadership on 
promoting fundamental rights across the world.”130  As the British 
paper The Guardian reports: 
[Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo said that the commission’s goal is 
to exclude “ad hoc” rights.  While he does not elaborate on what “ad 
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hoc” rights are, he attacks “politicians and bureaucrats” who “create 
new rights”, and many of the members of the commission appear to 
have been selected in no small part because they also want to roll 
back human rights.131 
I expect that children’s rights will be among the “ad hoc” human 
rights under attack.  This is why I am extremely grateful to Professor 
Dowd for Reimagining Equality and for her recently published and 
totally brilliant articulation of a constitutional argument for children’s 
rights.132 
While my faith in the Supreme Court is shaken, I still have faith in 
the American people’s support for the proposition that the 
Constitution was written for the ages and will continue to evolve.  It 
will be up to the young people — my children’s and grandchildren’s 
generation — to keep up the fight for human rights.  Unfortunately, 
our young people have a lot on their plates right now.133  Given the 
existential crisis of climate change looming over our nation and our 
planet, it may seem as if worrying about equality and children’s rights 
is like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.  I would propose a 
slightly different metaphor.  Our collective survival depends on 
acknowledging our vessel’s vulnerability, seeing the iceberg we are 
approaching before it is too late, and providing seaworthy lifeboats 
for all children, not just the richest and most privileged. 
 
 
 131. Michael H. Fuchs, Donald Trump Is on an Orwellian Mission to Redefine 
Human Rights, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/18/trump-pompeo-human-
rights-un-orwellian-mission-redefine [https://perma.cc/DEW5-4JYQ]. 
 132. Nancy Dowd, Children’s Equality Rights: Every Child’s Right to Develop to 
Their Full Capacity, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 133. See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 2020 WL 254149, at *5 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 
2020) (denying Article III standing to group of young people alleging U.S. 
government violated substantive due process, equal protection, the Ninth 
Amendment, and the public trust doctrine by subsidizing and authorizing fossil fuel 
extraction and consumption, leading to harmful climate change). 
